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RECENT CASE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEVENTH AMENDMENT -
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN SECTION 1983 DAMAGE ACTIONS
Lawton v. Nightingale,
345 F. Supp. 683
(N.D. Ohio 1972).
In Lawton v. Nightingale,' a federal district court held that the
seventh amendment2 right to jury trial does not apply to an action
for money damages brought pursuant to section 1983, the Civil
Rights Statute.3 Relying in part on the premise that the policy of
this statute could be defeated by a jury drawn from a hostile
community, the court denied the defendants' timely demand for
a jury trial. Despite extensive commentary on juries in general'
there has been little discussion of the precise question presented in
Lawton. Because the decision suggests the major arguments sur-
rounding this issue, it will be used here as a vehicle to investigate
this previously unexplored area.
The occurrences that led to the Lawton decision began on a
weekend in November 1970, when Charles Lawton, a high school
senior, was arrested for selling narcotics and placed in detention at
the Toledo Child Study Institute. The following Monday a deten-
tion hearing was held and he was released in the custody of his par-
ents. The next morning the plaintiff returned to school but was
denied admission by the defendants, members of the school's admin-
istration. At least one of these administrators told the plaintiff that
he was a "germ whose presence would infect the school body."5
1 345 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII, provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4 See, e.g., James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655; D.
KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 66 (1970).
5 Lawton v. Nightingale, Civil No. C 70-343 (N.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 15, 1971)
(mem.) (refusing the defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction).
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Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an action under section 1983
seeking both to enjoin the school from denying him admittance and
to recover money damages. A preliminary injunction was granted,
and after the defendants applied for and were denied a stay of the
injunction,6 the only issue remaining was that of damages. The de-
fendants first moved for a summary judgment on this issue on the
theory of sovereign immunity, and, after this was denied,' they filed
a timely demand for a jury trial.
Although Judge Young stated several reasons for denying defen-
dants' demand, it is clear that "policy" was the major rationale un-
derlying the decision. The decision was premised upon the fear
that granting the defendants' motion would "totally defeat the pur-
poses of § 1983."'  Reliance on the purposes of section 1983 is mis-
placed, however, for no clear indication of the precise purposes for
which the section was enacted can be gleaned from the legislative
history of its predecessor Act.9 The court, therefore, could not
6Id.
7 Lawton v. Nightingale, Civil No. C 70-343 (N.D. Ohio, filed May 15, 1972).
8 345 F. Supp. at 684.
9 The current section 1983 can trace its origins to section 1 of the Ku Klux Act
of 1871 which was enacted after President Ulysses S. Grant sent Congress a special
message urging the passage of legislation to deal with "A condition of affairs which
now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure."
CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st. Sess. 244 (1871). The President was referring to the
rising tide of terrorism in the Southern States led by the Ku Klux Klan, which had been
established in 1866. The purpose of section 1 of this Act might have been "to provide-
civil and criminal sanctions to deter infringements upon civil rights." 1 B.
ScHwARTz, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL RIGHTS 591 (1970).
However, there is a dearth of legislative history despite the hundreds of pages of re-
corded debate on the Act. There was no committee report on the Bill and much of
the floor discussion centered on the truth or falsity of the allegations of wide-spread
violence in the Southern States. See generally CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1871).
Also found within the debates over the Act is an indication that at least one mem-
ber of Congress shared the same apprehension that Judge Young apparently felt. Mr.
Hoar of Massachusetts stated:
Now, it is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws
when any class of officers charged under the laws with their administration
permanently and as a rule refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff
in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man and those sheriffs
are kept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina, and no verdict
against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a South Carolinajury, the State of South Carolina, through the class of officers who are its rep-
resentatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of citizens,
has denied that protection. If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as
a rule refuse to do justice between man and man where the rights of a par-
ticular class of its citizens are concerned, and that State affords by its legisla-
tion no remedy, that is as much a denial to that class of citizens of the equal
protection of the laws as if the State itself put on its statute-book a statute
enacting that no verdict should be rendered in the courts of that State in favor
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enumerate what the purposes underlying the section are, but did
state that, "[i]f a jury could be resorted to in actions brought under
this statute, the very evil the statute is designed to prevent would
often be attained. The person seeking to vindicate an unpopular
right could never succeed before a jury drawn from a populace
mainly opposed to his views.""' The court further suggested that
even a change of venue would not effectively counter these poten-
tially adverse public attitudes."
It therefore appears that the primary motivation behind denying
the defendants' jury demand was a mistrust of the jury's ability to
deal with the potentially emotional and inflammatory issues pre-
sented by 1983 actions. These arguments are, of course, often ad-
vanced by those whose views are antithetical to the views of the
majority of the populace from which juries are drawn. Similar feel-
ings of mistrust have, at times, led the Supreme Court to question
the jury's capacity to exclude certain facts from its deliberations' 2
and to remain completely impartial. But the Court's decisions on
this subject have been far from consistent.'3 Furthermore, the end
result of such decisions was merely to take certain issues away from
the jury; the right to trial by jury was not affected.
It is undoubtedly true that many plaintiffs will be greatly incon-
venienced by granting a defendant's demand for a jury trial. in a
section 1983 action and some may be subjected to the vagaries of a
prejudiced jury.' 4 And although the denial of a jury trial in a case
of this class of citizens. Id. at 334, cited in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
177 (1961).
After examining the legislative history, Mr. Justice Douglas listed "three main aims"
of section 1983: (1) overriding certain kinds of state laws; (2) providing a remedy
when state law is inadequate; and (3) providing a remedy when the state recourse is
adequate in theory but not available in practice. 365 U.S. at 173-74. Mr. Justice
Douglas also noted that another reason for the legislation was "to afford a federal right
in federal courts because by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or other-
wise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies." Id. at 180. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 672 (1963).
10 345 F. Supp. at 684.
11 Id. at 685.
12 See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b).
1' Compare Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) with Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) and Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477 (1972).
14 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) for an example of juror
bias. In this case the Court reversed the jury verdict against the New York Times on
first amendment grounds. The jury had awarded the local police commissioner a sub-
stantial amount of money in his libel action against the newspaper.
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like Lawton would probably be more in tune with the functional
purpose of the statute, these policy reasons alone are insufficient to
overcome the compelling logic and precedent in favor of granting
a jury trial.
Although few courts have specifically dealt with the applicability
of jury trials to section 1983 actions,15 the general question of the
right to jury trial has been dealt with at length by both courts and
commentators, 16 many of whom have been highly critical of the jury
system.17  Notwithstanding this criticism, the Supreme Court has
been quite adamant in its defense of the jury trial in civil cases. It
has characterized this right as a basic and fundamental feature of
our system of jurisprudence which "should be jealously guarded by
the courts.:" 8
Despite the Supreme Court's affirmation of the historical pre-
sumption in favor of a civil jury, Judge Young made several inter-
15 See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Turner v. Fouche, 290 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.
Ga. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). Except for these few cases,
it appears that most courts have made automatic assumptions as to the existence or non-
existence of the right to jury trial in section 1983 civil rights actions. Many empanel
juries without analyzing the propriety of such action. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407
F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1970); Basista v. Weir, 225 F.
Supp. 619 (M.D. Pa. 1964), modified, 340 F.2d 74 (1965).
16 One commentator has estimated that over three hundred articles have been writ-
ten on the subject Broeder, Memorandum Regarding Jury Systems, Hearings on Re-
cording of Jury Deliberations Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Internal Security
Act of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1955).
17 Criticism of the civil jury system generally focuses on: (1) the inordinant amount
of time that it consumes, see, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, DELAY IN THE COURT
(1959), thereby imposing a crushing burden-upon the courts and excessive delays in the
criminal calendar; (2) the type of case in which a jury is generally demanded (mainly
personal injury and products liabilities actions) see, e.g., O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil
Cases?, 58 ILL. B.J. 796 (1970); and (3) the fact that England has abolished the civil
jury in all but a few situations without raising any serious or sustained opposition.
The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5,
c. 36, § 6. See Ward v. James [1965] 1 All E.R. 563.
The late Judge Frank was one of the most prominent of these critics. He discussed
three theories as to how juries function. The naive theory is that the jury merely finds
the facts; that it must not, and does not, concern itself with the legal rules, but faithfully
accepts and acts according to the directions of the trial judge. A second more sophisti-
cated theory suggests tlhat the jury not only finds the facts but, in its jury-room deliber-
ation uses legal reasdning to apply to those facts the legal rules it learned from the
judge. The third or "realistic" theory is based on what anyone can discover by ques-
tioning the average person who has served as a juror - namely that often the jury is
neither able to, nor does it attempt to, apply the instructions of the court. The jury
is more brutally direct. Once they determine that Jones should collect $5000 from the
railroad company, or that pretty Nellie Brown should not go to jail for killing her hus-
band, they bring in their general verdict accordingly. Often, according to this third
view the judge's careful statement of the legal rules is superfluous ornamentation. J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-11 (1949).
Is Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 753 (1942). Accord, Dimick v. Schiedr, 293
U.S. 474 (1935).
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esting, but rebuttable, legal arguments to support his policy decision.
First, he rejected the defendants' argument that the issue was gov-
erned by Beacon Theatres v. Westover 9 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood,2" dismissing these cases as being a mere "gloss" upon the
seventh amendment.2 '
Prior to Beacon Theatres, where legal and equitable issues in a
case were factually related, the crucial question of whether a judge
or jury would hear the facts was generally decided by the "basic
nature of the issues" involved.22 If the complaint, read as a whole,
presented basically equitable questions, all of the issues were de-
termined by a judge sitting without a jury even if "legal" issues
were present. The holding of Beacon Theatres fundamentally mod-
ified this approach.
Beacon Theatres was originally a suit for declaratory relief
brought by Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc., against Beacon alleging
a controversy arising under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act2 and section 4 of the Clayton Act. 4 Beacon counter-
claimed, charging Fox with violating the antitrust laws, and de-
manded a jury trial. The district court denied this request, ruling
that the issues raised by Fox's complaint were essentially equitable
and should be tried to the court before jury consideration of Bea-
con's counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that com-
mon issues pervaded both the complaint and the counterclaim and
that Beacon could not be deprived of its jury trial right merely
because "Fox took advantage of the availability of declaratory relief
to sue Beacon first. ' 25
The Court emphasized that since legal and equitable causes could
be joined in one action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"the issues between these parties could be settled in one suit giving
Beacon a full jury trial of every antitrust issue.' 26 It was, therefore,
improper to force Beacon to split its case, "trying part to a judge
19 359 U.S. 500 (.1959).
20 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
21 345 F. Supp. at 684.
2 2 See, e.g., Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946); Ettelson v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943); Hargrove
v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1942); General Motors Corp. v.
California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del. 1949).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
24 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). This section of the Clayton Act authorizes suits for
treble damages against violators of the antitrust laws.
25 359 U.S. at 504.
26Id. at 508.
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and part to a jury."27 The Court did note that where it was impos-
sible to protect a party seeking equitable relief while at the same
time affording a jury trial on the legal questions involved, a court,
in its discretion, could separate the claims and try the equitable is-
sues first. But the Court left no doubt as to the narrowness of this
exception: "Since the right to jury trial is a constitutional one, how-
ever, while no similar requirement protects trials by the court, that
discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible,
be exercised to preserve jury trial."28
Thus Beacon Theatres shifted the "basic nature of the issues"
test from the presence of a basis for equitable relief to the presence
of a legal issue. Where a legal claim is involved, Beacon Theatres
dictates that the right to a jury trial may be denied only under the
"most imperative circumstances."2 9
Two years later, in Thermo-Stitch Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing
Corp.,80 Judge Wisdom construed Beacon Theatres to mean that it
made no difference whether the equitable cause dearly outweighed
the legal cause, even to the extent that the basic issue of the case
taken as a whole was equitable. "As long as any legal cause is in-
volved, the jury rights it creates control."'" This interpretation was
subsequently endorsed 'n Dairy Queen, where the Supreme Court
stated that the holding in Beacon Theatres applied even if the trial
judge chose to characterize the legal issues as only "incidental" to
the equitable issues. "Beacon Theatres requires that any legal issues
for which a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded be sub-
mitted to a jury. "32 These three cases dearly indicate that character-
ization of the overall action as legal or equitable will not control
the granting of a motion for a jury trial. When legal and equi-
table claims co-exist a jury trial is mandated, 3 absent the "impera-
tive circumstances" exception of Beacon. A fortiori, where there
is only a legal claim involved in an action, the right to trial by jury
cannot be denied.
The Court further clarified the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen
27 Id.
28 Id. at 510 (foomote omitted).
29 Id. at 511. The Court did not elaborate on what it meant by the elusive phrase
"imperative circumstances." Apparently the Court added the qualification for a pos-
sible future dilemma, since it noted that "in view of the flexible procedures of the Fed-
eral Rules we cannot now anticipate" such circumstances. See note 68 infra.
80 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961).
81 Id. at 491.
32 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 473.
83 5 J. MooRn, FEDEEAL PRAcricE, 5 38.16[2] at 162.4 (2d ed. 1971).
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approach in Ross v. Bernhard,4 when it stated that "[t]he Seventh
Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried
rather than the character of the overall action."35 Any question con-
cerning the legal nature of the issue before the Lawton court -
damages - is amply answered both by precedent" and by an analy-
sis of the test set forth in Ross: "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is
determined by considering, first, the pre-merger [of law and equity]
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought;
and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. 37
The analysis mandated by the first part of the Ross test requires
"extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry [and] is obviously
the most difficult to apply. ' 3 8  It would appear that this test may
be satisfied in at least two ways: (1) by finding a contemporary ex-
position of what the custom was, or (2) by making an independent
determination of whether similar actions were previously character-
ized as legal or equitable, that is, by fitting the action under consid-
eration into its nearest historical analogy. The application of this
twofold historical analysis is also helpful because, after summarily
dismissing Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, the court in Lawton
looked to the language of the seventh amendment and argued that
-lilt cannot be pretended that the present action is a 'Suit at com-
mon law'" to which the amendment speaks.3" However, in apply-
ing the first part of the Ross test it becomes dear that the action
involved in Lawton was indeed a suit at common law.
In an early case, Parsons v. Bedford, ° the Court recognized that
in almost every state there existed legal remedies that differed from
the old common law forms of action, and that new rights and rem-
edies would inevitably arise that could not be forced into one of
the rigid common law molds. The Court, determining that the
Constitution was to be a living rather than static organism, held
that by "common law" the framers of the seventh amendment
meant not merely suits that the common law recognized among
its old and settled proceedings, but
... suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and deter-
84 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
35 Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
36 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 476-77. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. at 542.
87 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
38 1d.
39 345 F. Supp. at 684.
40 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
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mined, in contradistinction to those, where equitable rights alone
were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered ....
In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to em-
brace all suits, which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle
legal rights.41
Under this reasoning, Lawton dearly falls within the ambit of the
seventh amendment since the only question is one of damages, and
neither admiralty nor equity is involved.
Another method of determining the "pre-merger custom" is to
attempt to fit the cause of action into its nearest historical anal-
ogy.42 One of the nearest is a suit seeking damages for the depriva-
tion of a voting right. The right to vote is one of the most cher-
ished and vital of all civil rights, and courts have been extremely
sensitive to any potential infringement of that right.4" The right
to recover damages for the deprivation of voting rights was assured
as early as 1703. In Ashby v. White,44 the plaintiff was allowed to
recover damages from an election officer who refused to admit his
vote in an election for members of Parliament. In the decision,
Chief Judge Holt said: "This right of voting is a right in the plain-
tiff by the common law and consequently he shall maintain an ac-
tion for the obstruction of it."45  This historical analogy reveals
that according to the custom in 1791, a suit for damages arising
from a deprivation of civil rights, was, indeed, a suit at common law,
and therefore falls within the protection of the seventh amendment.
But it is not necessary to rely solely on antediluvian decisions to
conclude that for seventh amendment purposes a suit at common
law includes the right to recover damages for deprivation of one's
civil rights. In Wiley v. Sinkler,46 for example, the Supreme Court
agreed that a suit seeking damages for a violation of one's voting
right "arose under" the Constitution. Although the action was dis-
missed because the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action, the Court noted in dictum that the amount
of damages recoverable was "peculiarly appropriate for the deter-
mination of a jury."147
41 Id. at 447.
42Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. at 543 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting), citing Luria v.
United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
43 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
44 2 Ld. Raym. 938,92 Eng. Rep. 126 (KB. 1703).
45Id. at 954, 92 Eng. Rep. at 136.
46 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
47 Id. at 65. See aho Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) (action states
bona fide federal question).
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Giles v. Harris,48 an action brought pursuant to a precursor of
the current section 1983,49 presented the Court with the question of
whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity
for the deprivation of voting rights. Although the Court held that
political wrongs are without the traditional limits of equity, and
that, therefore, equitable relief could not be granted,50 it stated that
it was "not prepared to say that an action at law could not be main-
tained on the facts alleged in the bill,"51 and indicated that damages
was an appropriate remedy.,2
The culmination of this line of reasoning is found in Nixon v.
Herndon,5 in which it was held that the deprivation of voting
rights was actionable and that damages could be recovered because
the Court found it "hard to imagine a more direct and obvious in-
fringement of the Fourteenth [Amendment '' 54 and because private
damages had been recoverable in a suit at law since Ashby v.
Wlhite.55
Therefore, both the "historical analogy" and the "contemporary
exposition" methods of determining pre-merger custom lead to the
same conclusion: an action for deprivation of civil rights is a suit
at common law. It is therefore doubtful whether the Lawton court
was correct in assuming that merely because the action was brought
pursuant to section 1983 it was not a suit cognizable at common
law, and, therefore, not included within the protection of the sev-
enth amendment.
The second part of the Ross test for determining the legal na-
ture of an issue is to examine the nature of the remedy being
sought. 6  In Lawton the remedy sought was damages. In Dairy
Queen, Mr. Justice Black speaking for the Court, agreed with the
petitioner that "insofar as the complaint requests a money judgment
it presents a claim which is unquestionably legal. ' 57  The Court
left no doubt as to this issue: "[W]e think it plain that [petitioner's]
claim for a money judgment is a claim wholly legal in its nature
48 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
49 Rev. Stat. § 1979. The language of the two statutes is virtually identical.
50 189 U.S. at 486.
51 ld. at 485.
52 Id. at 488.
58 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
54 Id. at 541.
55 Id. at 540.
56 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
67 369 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
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however the complaint is construed."58 Although no authority was
cited by Mr. Justice Black for this proposition, numerous pre-59 and
post- 0 merger decisions have stated that if there is a prayer for a
money judgment the action is one at law for the purpose of deter-
mining the right to jury trial.6' The only issue before the Lawton
court was one of damages, and "where damages constitute the sole
relief sought, the action is legal in character and there is normally
a constitutional right of jury trial."62
The third part of the Ross test, relating to the practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries, 63 is an extremely "gray" area of the
law. 4 Although the Lawton court did not discuss Ross, it may have
tacitly given great weight to this factor in reaching the conclusion
that jury trials were inappropriate in section 1983 actions.
This part of the test, however, is of questionable value for
several reasons. Perhaps the most difficult problem is its ambiguity.
Exactly what does "practical abilities and limitations of juries" refer
to? If it refers to mistrust of a jury's logical ability to make subtle
legal distinctions and to exclude certain facts from its considera-
tion," then it seems to afford no weight at all to the Lawton posi-
tion. If, on the other hand "practical ... limitations" refers to hu-
man susceptibility to emotional prejudice, it might be worthy of
more weight. This emotional weakness, however, can be ascribed
to all juries and it would seem inappropriate to emphasize human
shortcomings in this isolated instance.
Second, it is doubtful that the third part of the Ross test is of
constitutional stature. The jury's "practical abilities and limita-
tions" have never been a part of the historical seventh amendment
test.6 6 The third part of the Ross test was announced in a footnote,
58 Id. at 477 (emphasis added). See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. at 542.
69 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891); Williamson v. Chicago Mill &
Lumber Corp., 59 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1932); Adams v. Jones, 11 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 271 U.S. 685 (1926).
60 Ring v. Spinna, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948); Ransom v. Staso Milling Co., 2
F.R.D. 128 (D. N.J. 1941); Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713
(D. N.J. 1941).
615 MOORE, supra note 33, 5 38.17 at 162.9-.10
62 Id., 5 38.19[1] at 166.
63 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
64 See notes 15-18 supra & accompanying text.
65 See notes 12-13 supra & accompanying text.
66 Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81
YALE L.J. 112, 130 (1971). The historical definition of common law court subject
matter jurisdiction was apparently more the result of a power struggle between the
equity chancery and the common law courts than a rational assessment of jury capabil-
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but was never mentioned in the reasoning of the case, which was
bottomed squarely on seventh amendment grounds.67 Thus there
is serious question whether this factor can be employed as anything
more than a makeweight.
Another difficulty with the Ross opinion is that it fails to indi-
cate how the three parts of its jury test are to be weighted and ap-
plied, and presumably any one of the three parts could be disre-
garded. In Ross, for example, in analyzing the "nature of the issue"
involved, the Court made no reference to the competence of juries
to handle such claims.
The vagueness of the "practical limitations" factor, coupled with
the clear mandate of the other two tests in favor of empanelling a
jury indicates that the defendants' timely demand for jury trial in
Lawton should have been granted.6"
Another reason given by the Lawton court for denying the jury
trial request was that it is "well established that the various special
statutory actions which have been created from time to time since
the adoption of the Seventh Amendment do not come within the
meaning of the common law."' 69  The inference to be drawn from
this is that if a special statutory action is created, no right to a jury
trial exists. This inference can best be rebutted by an examination
of the very statutes cited by the court: the Sherman Act, 70 Clayton
Act,71 Securities Act of 1933,72 and the National Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act.78
ities. Id. Contra Williams v. Florida, 399 US. 78 (1970) where the Court eschewed
the historical approach in determining the rights to jury trial in a state criminal action in
favor of a functional approach.
67 396 U.S. at 542.
68 One might argue that Ross and Beacon Theatres can be read to permit a jury
trial in a situation such as Lawton. The argument would be that the Lawton situation
fits within the "most imperative circumstances" exception in Beacon, see note 29 supra.
since the purposes of section 1983 could be totally defeated by the use of a jury. This
is unconvincing, however, for the Court stated that it could not anticipate at the time of
Beacon such imperative circumstances. Because the procedure followed in Lawton was
not uncommon, and the effect of Beacon on section 1983 damage actions was- cer-
tainly forseeable, it is unlikely that such circumstances could be considered unantic-
ipated and within the exception. However, if it is somehow argued that the possiblejury prejudice in 1983 actions is one of the circumstances which the Court in Beacon
Theatres did not anticipate, and that the "practical abilities and limitations" of juries
of Ross refers to human shortcomings such as prejudice, then a court might be con-
vinced that a jury trial should be denied in 1983 actions.
69 345 F. Supp. at 684.
70 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-33 (1970).
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
7S 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
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(1) The Sherman and Clayton Acts: In addition to the fact that
Beacon Theatres involved these statutes, 4 in Fleitmann v. Welsbach
Co.,75 the Supreme Court noted in dictum that when a penalty of
treble damages is sought, these statutes should not be read as "at-
tempting to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through
the verdict of a jury in a court of common law. On the contrary, it
provides the latter remedy and it provides no other."76 This lan-
guage was later referred to in Beacon Theatres to demonstrate that
the right to jury trial is an integral part of the congressional scheme
for making competition rather than monopoly the rule of trade and
that the "Sherman and Clayton Act issues on which Fox sought a
declaration were essentially jury questions." 77
(2) The Securities Acts:7 Prior to 1970, there was a split in the
circuits as to whether certain issues arising in stockholder's derivative
actions, traditionally cognizable in equity, were to be treated as legal
or equitable. Some circuits held that a derivative action was en-
tirely equitable, 9 while another found certain issues within these
actions to be legal in nature.80 In deciding that the seventh amend-
ment does guarantee the right to jury trial in a stockholder's deriva-
tive action brought under the Investment Company Act of 1940,s1
the Court in Ross held that "the right to jury trial attaches to those
issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, if it had been
suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury."'82 The
Court there developed the "nature of the issue" test for determina-
tion of'the right to jury trial.8 Now, with any private right of ac-
tion cognizable by the federal courts in which a legal issue exists,
there is little doubt as to the need to empanel a jury should one be
requested.
That the right to jury trial exists in actions under the securities
74 See notes 23-24 supra & accompanying text.
71 240 U.S. 27 (1915).
76Id. at 29.
77 359 U.S. at 504.
78 Although Lawton cited only the Securities Act of 1933, this discussion will deal
with the federal securities acts in general.
79 Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). See
also Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F.
Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
80 De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
82 396 U.S. at 532-33. See 3 L. Loss, SEculurnEs REGuLATION 1849-51 (2d ed.
1961).
83 See notes 34-35 supra & accompanying text.
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acts is also apparent in Myzel v. Fields,8 which involved a claim
seeking recission or damages under Securities and Exchange Com-
mission rule lob-5.85 Since the plaintiffs had disposed of their stock,
the trial court treated the action as one at law for money damages.
In affirming the grant of a jury trial, the Eighth Circuit stated:
"In their complaint and throughout the trial, the plaintiffs insisted
upon their right of trial by jury, and the [districtj court, ielying
upon [Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatresl properly refused to strike
the case from the jury docket."8' 6
(3) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959:
In Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers Union, 7 the defendant had
not objected to plaintiff's jury demand until after the verdict had
been rendered. After affirming the district court's denial of the ob-
jection as untimely, the Fourth Circuit noted that:
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.
The right asserted is indeed one created by statute, but we do not
agree that a jury trial is necessarily unavailable because the suit
for damages is one to vindicate a statutory right. There is no...
deavage between rights existing under common law and rights es-
tablished by enacted law, where the relief sought is an award of
damages. 88
The apparent reason underlying the reluctance of most courts
to limit the availability of a jury in statutory actions was articulated
in United States v. Jepson."9 The court there held- that the right to
a jury trial in an action for debt prevails regardless of the fact that
the action is brought under a statute: "To hold otherwise would be
to open the way for Congress to nullify the Constitutional right of
trial by jury by mere statutory enactments."9 This cogent reason-
84 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
85 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
8 6 386 F.2d at 741.
87350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
88 Id. at 1018, citing, inter alia, Beacon Theatres. Contra, McCraw v. United Ass'n
of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Indus., 341 F.2d
705 (6th Cir. 1965).
Jury trials on the question of damages have also been granted in other statutory ac-
tions. E.g., Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 240 F.2d 444
(9th Cir. 1957) (action by war contractor under Contract Settlement Act of 1944 §
13(b) (2), 41 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2) (1970); Wirtz v. Thompson Packers, Inc., 224 F.
Supp. 960 (E.D. La. 1963) (action under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16(b)
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Steffen v. Farmers Elevator Serv. Co., 109 F.
Supp. 16 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (action against former employer for re-employment under
Universal Military Training and Service Act § 9(d), 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(d) (1970).
89 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1960).
90 d. at 986.
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ing cuts strongly against the distinction that the Lawton court
draws between a special statutory action and a suit at common law.9 1
Each of the statutes cited by the Lawton court and discussed
above deals with a relatively small, narrowly circumscribed area of
the law, that requires a degree of sophistication for comprehen-
sion. By comparison, section 1983 deals with the area of "civil
rights," specifically the "deprivation of any rights, privileges or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws," which can hardly
be depicted as either narrow or small.
Furthermore, the language of section 1983 encompasses "pro-
cedings in equity, actions at law, or other proper proceeding for
redress." If the words that Congress deliberately adopted are to
be given their natural meaning and not tortured beyond recogni-
tion for policy reasons, the inescapable conclusion is that Congress
anticipated that actions at law would be brought pursuant to this
statute and that the normal accoutrements of such an action, such as
a jury trial, would attach. It is doubtful whether the drafters of this
legislation felt a need to spell out the obvious proposition that a
suit in equity would be before a judge sitting without a jury, and
that an action at law would be before judge and jury if the jury
demand were timely made.
There have, however, been lower court decisions holding that no
right to jury trial existed in an action brought to vindicate a statu-
tory right. McFerren v. County Board of Education,2 a Sixth Cir-
cuit decision cited in the Lawton opinion, was an appeal by a local
school board from an order requiring it to rehire (with back pay)
thirteen black school teachers who had been discharged. In holding
that the defendants had no right to a jury trial on the issue of back
pay, the court relied heavily upon the fact that the claim for back
pay was wholly incidental to the equitable relief sought in this claim
for reinstatement.9" Although the Lawton court may have felt com-
pelled to follow this Sixth Circuit decision, it can be easily distin-
guished from Lawton since the back pay demand in McFerren was
9 1 As society and the law change, an array of actions will undoubtedly develop that
neither existed at common law nor analogize easily to any common law action. If
Judge Young's logic were to be extended, Congress could eliminate the right to jury in
these new actions. This elimination of the jury on historical grounds, however, would
be inconsistent with the spirit of the seventh amendment and the functional purpose of
the jury.
92 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
9 3 Accord, Harkless v. Sweeny Independeat School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
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an integral part of the reinstatement claim, and such claims are
traditionally cognizable only in equity.
A case not cited by Judge Young, Cheatwood v. South Central
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,94 in which the defendant's de-
mand for a jury trial was denied, seems at first glance to support
the Lawton position. In Cheatwood, the plaintiff allegedly suf-
fered discrimination violative of the equal employment opportun-
ity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95 Similarly, in
Cauley v. Smith,98 which involved, inter alia, a prayer for punitive
damages in an action brought under the 1968 Fair Housing Act,9"
the defendant was not permitted a jury trial.
In both Cheatwood and Cauley, however, the courts expressly
based their decision on the statutory language involved, which
either gave broad discretion to the court9 8 or expressly provided for
the determination of certain issues by the court.99 These cases are,
therefore, clearly distinguishable from an action brought pursuant
to section 1983 which expressly provides for an "action at law" in
addition to a "suit in equity."
Many of the opinions that deny jury trials in actions brought
pursuant to statutes make valiant attempts to distinguish Beacon
Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross. One opinion advanced the rather
tenuous argument that neither Beacon Theatres nor Dairy Queen in-
volved back pay, but that each involved separate legal and equitable
claims joined in the same action and was therefore different from
the case at bar.' Aside from the questionable validity of such dis-
tinctions, Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross have made it un-
mistakably clear that if a legal question is involved in an action,
94 303 F. Supp. 754 (D. Ala. 1969).
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to c-8 (1970).
96 347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972).
97 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
9842 U.S.C. § 3612(c) provides that "the court may grant as relief, as it deems ap-
propriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order or other
order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1000 puni-
tive damages .. " (Emphasis added).
99 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is in-
tentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization,
as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice). (Em-
phasis added).
100 Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
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either party is entitled to a jury for its resolution. To answer this
requirement with the notion that the legal remedies are incidental
to, and flow inevitably from, prior resolution of the equitable issues
is no answer at all. In all actions requesting injunctive relief and
damages, any resolution of the merits in favor of the plaintiff will
cause the legal remedies to flow. The problem with this approach
is that the Supreme Court has made it clear that juries are required
to resolve all questions that bear upon the legal issues involved.
Therefore, to allow a jury to decide only the amount of damages
recoverable appears to be little more than an impermissible attempt
to circumvent Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen and Ross.
The final basis advanced by the Lawton court for its decision
was that no precedent existed on the precise question presented.1' 1
However, counsel and the court apparently overlooked Turner v.
Fouche"0 2 which was a section 1983 class action brought by Negroes
against the local school board and jury commissioners. The plain-
tiffs sought a declaratory judgment and ancillary money damages.
On the jury question, the court explicitly stated: "Defendants claim
a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial if the question [of dam-
ages) is to be considered and we hold that there is merit in this
contention."'' 0 3 Clearly Turner should have entered into the de-
cision-making process of the Lawton court since the court's decision
is based in part on the "absence of . . . precise authority for [the
defendants'] position."' 4
It is highly unlikely that the Lawton court would have side-
stepped both the obvious and subtle legal problems involved in
denying the defendants' jury demand were it not for its apparent
bias in favor of the policy involved. Functionally, these policies
may be more closely related to the purposes of section 1983, but
they are nevertheless insufficient to overcome the basic constitutional
considerations surrounding jury trials which clearly point the other
way. Nor are they sufficient to override the clear language of sec-
tion 1983 allowing recovery in an "action at law" which, when
coupled with the seventh amendment's command that "In Suits at
common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," make
it imperative that if a timely demand is made in a civil rights action,
a jury trial must be granted.
EDWARD F. SIEGEL
101 345 F. Supp. at 685.
1o2 290 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ga. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 396 U.S. 346
(1970).
'o3 290 F. Supp. at 652.
104 345 F. Supp. at 685.
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